By Lauren Dotson Trinity University

Introduction:

Human knowledge and knowledge of non-human organisms cannot justifiably be separated. Knowledge is belief which is reli- ably produced based on truth. Knowledge, for an organism, must then have some kind of system of truth—structure which allows belief to have basis—which informs decision-making. A sys- tem of knowledge burgeons from this establishment of truth, al- lowing for of the justifications of knowledge to be shared amongst all those who reliably and con- sistently inhabit reality. Systems of belief can be cultivated based on coherentist theory thus allow- ing for fallible ideas of truth to be justifiably gleaned. Through this framework, organisms can under- stand a proposition of kind, p, to be true. An explicit criteria can be fabricated from this system allow- ing for truth and falsehood to be observed from a range of organ- isms. Then, human knowledge is set on the same criteria as non- human organisms. Due to a slid- ing scale of cognitive capacities the capabilities for knowledge can vary; still, knowledge is distinctly on the same scale for all organisms.

Defense:

Coherentism is the epistemic justification of belief which ar- gues that circular reasoning is justified grounds for establish- ing truth in a fallible manner. As stated by Laurence Bonjour, coherentism attempts to estab- lish a method of epistemic belief which avoids the epistemic regress problem. The epistemic regress problem states that any rationalization for basic beliefs can only be justified if the justi- fication does not end in: circular reasoning, infinite regress, and termination in unjustified belief. Bonjour’s coherentism firstly argues for circular reasoning go- ing against the epistemic regress problem to assert that belief can be justified via circular reason- ing formats. Bonjour thus uses circular reasoning to state thata belief can be justified by the: inferability from another set of particular beliefs, coherence and justification of the overall system of basic empirical beliefs, and, given that the justification of a particular basic empirical belief is due to its standing in the system of other basic empirical beliefs (Bonjour 2002, p. 389). Further, this system of belief can be justi- fied via the observation require- ment which allows sense data to justify belief (Bonjour 2002, 396).

This kind of proposed system allows for a sequence and system of thoughts to be crafted for an individual allowing truth to be found fallibly through epistemic belief. This proves to be a crucial point because this allows organ- isms to have a system of truth which is true and can be fallibly understood based on their per- sonal cognitive abilities. Organ- isms can have a range of cogni- tive abilities which allow them to understand their systems of truth differently. I argue that the sys-tem of truth for organisms stack on each other as cognitive ability increases. Thus, our systems of truth are different, but only in the sense that there are more de- tails and empirical beliefs that ex- ist as cognitive ability increases. That is, some organisms maintain a higher order, more sophisticat- ed, belief system than others, but these beliefs in themselves are justified by a coherentist frame- work. The coherentist framework that this paper will be working within does not necessarily en- tail Bonjour’s exact coherentist theory, but parts of Bonjour’s coherentism, elaborated and re- constructed to better answer the epistemic belief question for organisms.

Thus, knowledge is truth which is reliably produced based on true belief that is true for
the system. Given both criteria are true then knowledge can be gleaned. If both aren’t true, and it's true only for the system, then you can have a system of belief and fallible truth but not knowl- edge. Knowledge has a circular structure because it allows for beliefs to connect and inform other beliefs that an individual holds. This kind of structure al- lows for inferential justification which can aid in the attenua- tion of new information into the organism’s system of belief and thus allow for truth to be had. Given that truth can be fallibly gained, that means these jus- tification of truth systems can be edited when they are proved wrong while still retaining truth and the possibility for knowledge.

Then, I argue that despite some organisms having a higher cognitive ability allowing for more elaborate systems of truth the justification for this truth is the same. This is because the organ- isms, if they interact with each other, must exist in the same plane allowing for the sense data of one organism to be compara- ble to the sense data of another organism. This base level sense data can be used as justification for epistemic beliefs (as a part of the observation requirement). This exhibits that organisms’, if they exist in the same plane and can actively build communities, must experience the same sense data which means that justification for beliefs must be the same for these organisms.

To elaborate, one might won- der if plants can have cognitive ability and such. To this I would say that we must first establish that the reason why sentient ani- mals can have a system of truth is because they have a mental- istic framework which can be observed through their behavior and social frameworks. For plants the same framework is not pre- sent as they consistently do not present a basal level of cognitive ability. I thus introduce a spec- trum basis where there is cogni- tive ability and sentience which plants do not appear to share; this mental representation does not appear in plants as plants respond in one or two ways which are particular and do not indicate the ability to reason and make spontaneous judgment which is available in higher mental state animals (Kornblith 2002, 39-42).

Animals and organisms have a system of truth of some kind. Animals’ specific behaviors and social practices are evidence of the fact that animals can cogni- tively create systems of truths and interact with these systems allowing for knowledge to be gleaned (Kornblith 2002, 34). Animals must then adhere to the observation requirement of the coherentist theory; individuals create a system of truth which allows them to have a fallible un- derstanding. For example, differ- ent species of birds have different mating and social requirements which allow them to garner mates. Flamingos are known for their ritualistic mating dance featuring sharp head movements and back-and-forth strides across a plain. Depending on the bird's environment, access to mates, and mood, the ritualistic dance can be modified to better secure a mate. This kind of complex activ- ity can further suggest animals are capable of creating systems of beliefs due to their ability to use the observation requirement to inform individual, and later col- lective action (Studer-Thiersch 2000, 150).

Furthermore, the flamingos’ behavior and success in their environment indicates cogni- tive ability. It is mentioned in the text that the flamingos can spot, evade, rebut and preda- tors depicting a cognitive ability which can be translated to dem- onstrated action (Studer-Thiersch 2000, 157). It is determined that animals consistently (as derived from our system of truth as de- scribed above) have intentional action which allows for intention- al purpose. Animal behavior is not random because the animals respond, particularly and specifi- cally, to their environment and outward influences (Kornblith 2002, 42). Thus this exhibits the idea that animals are affected and influenced by the exterior world; this further demonstrates cognitive ability as the animals actively make decisions and re- spond to their system’s of truth.

The crucial part is that col- lective action occurs for these organisms; the flamingo’s actively work together as a unit to recon- struct their mating dance. This exhibits how organism’s existing on the same plane can share the same experience of sense data which serves as justification for their belief. and thus later in- forming decision-making; in this case, how the mating dance will manifest in a particular season. Moreover, flamingo’s seem to ex- hibit a level of cognitive ability in order to be able to complete these actions; however, this cognitive ability, based on what we have qualitatively observed from these birds, does not seem to be on the same level as human cognitive ability. Yet, these animals are still able to interpret their environment in a similar manner to how humans would. That is, flamingos are able to interpret their sense data to be able to, for example, recognize time of day and sched- ule their routines based on the perceived time (whether it's light or dark outside). Humans can also recognize time of day and we also schedule routines based on this.

This was an elaborate example to explain that despite flamingos and humans being vastly different organisms they can experience sense data in a similar manner and have specific reactions to this data. Furthermore, there is a dis- tinct cognitive difference between these two organisms given that one set is able to effectively create rudimentary societal structures (flamingos) and the other able to build exceedingly complex societal structures and systems (humans). Thus, this exhibits that despite the cognitive divide, the funda- mental justifications to allow for the creation of these structures lies in sense data that we appear to interpret in similar fashions; that is, the justifications for our, flamingo and human, beliefs come from the same source, yet the way that sense data is later interpret- ed and used depends on the cog- nitive ability of the organism. This kind of analysis can also be ap- plied to a wide variety of sentient organisms, which appear to build structures similar to humans.

An objection may arise that suggests that human cognitive ability is vastly different from other organisms and should thus exist in its own category due to the existence of complex language systems and societal structures. That is, the existence of, specifi- cally, human language provides

a basis to assert that justifiably differentiates human system
of truth (and thus knowledge) from non-human system of truth and knowledge. I argue that the capacity for language is not es- sential to change the standard of knowledge because the systems of truth still conform to the present basic facts which then inform the human ability to converse. This base level of truth is then shared amongst all organisms, however humans may be the only ones to have the active cognitive ability to build off the essential truths and converse—this does not speak to the fact that system of truth is inaccurate for other organisms’ instead it confirms that different cognitive abilities are present among disjoint organisms. To elu- cidate, despite other organisms, say the flamingo, not having a method of concrete communica- tion, this does not mean they are unable to represent facts about the world. Flamingos must have some other form of communica- tion between themselves which al- lows for the species to build their intricate mating styles. This kind of logic may also be applied to other species of organisms.

To conclude, I assert that or- ganisms do not need language to have belief when the justifica- tion for belief is based around the same sense data that all organ- isms appear to share which al- lows for lower-level signs of com- munication which can in itself show that organisms have the similar systems of truth. That is, animal behavior exhibits social interaction which confirms that the justification for their systems are shared between organisms as exhibited through animal social hierarchies and ability to repro- duce which is akin to rudimen- tary human communities.

Reflection, as in internal thoughts of memories and infor- mation, furthermore, is necessary for the justification of retained belief. I argue that the existence of different mental capacities does not make knowledge differ- ent for different minds because the standards of knowledge re- main consistent despite differenc- es in cognitive capacities (Korn- blith 2002, 105). Then, organisms must retain a baseline ability to reflect which allows them to build these systems of belief and make decisions based on their systems. For example, this would be how flamingos are able to change their mating dance depending
on mood, place or both (Studer- Thiersch). Thus, the ability of organisms to curve or change behavior based on success or mood entails reflection because it demonstrates the ability to build some kind of rudimentary system to organize thoughts. That is, I’m suggesting that the motions of organisms and the routines they appear to have are not arbitrary but suggest a sort of cognitive intelligence which is elementa- rily comparable to human intel- ligence. Observed consistency is then seen within these sentient organisms which allows for this direct action to be detected. This kind of system creation and use is of course fallible—prone to mistakes—and yet this does not suggest that these decisions are randomly made, merely that they are based in a system which has been inaccurately constructed. For example, when a young fla- mingo tries to find a mate dur- ing a low rainfall season and is subsequently rejected by all the females who only mate during high rainfall (because more food is available at this time) (Struder- Thiersch 2002, 154).

To clarify, human knowledge cannot be argued to be separate from non-human knowledge on the basis of reflection as this then asserts that there is a specific threshold of metacognition that is necessary to have all knowledge in itself. I argue that reflection is a sliding scale ability that or- ganisms who are able to actively react to their surroundings uti- lize in order to have spontaneous decision-making. There is not a threshold for metacognition then but more of the recognition of the ability and the different levels of said ability. Thus the ability to reflect is necessary for reflec- tion and I argue that because of organisms spontaneous abil- ity to decide they demonstrate a level of reflection which fits the coherentist framework. To givean example, when a dog sticks its head into a prickly cactus and gets stabbed. The dog will later avoid such plants in the future demonstrating an action which reflects the dog's understanding of its system of belief. This would then demonstrate the dog’s ability to cognitively reflect—as the dog’s actions speak to recognizing a piece of information in their belief framework and utilizing this be- lief to act. Further its the beings ability to also have spontaneous action despite their systems of belief which can be categorizedas exploration; this helps dis- tinguish the sentient being as 1) having an internal state and 2) acting as a sentient being not a reactionary machine (Kornblith 2002, 37).

Yet another objection would be one that discounts the foun- dations of coherentism. Given that coherentism works off a circular framework some may wonder how this kind of system avoids the epistemic regress problem surrounding circular reasoning. To this I would re- spond by maintaining that the coherentist framework is a dif- ferent kind of belief system alto- gether which requires that the system itself be both the justifica- tion and evidence of belief. Given that the two other parts of the regress problem—termination in unjustified belief and going on infinitely—are versions of skepti- cism then the circularity premise is the only one to which a system of coherent belief can be framed (Bonjour 2002, 389). It is akin to viewing the problem of epistemic regress in a different light, coher- entism is a completely different kind of belief system from that of its predecessor: foundationalism. Further, the coherentist frame- work is like comparing algebra versus calculus—both of which are completely different and ap- proach solutions to the same problem divergently

Summary

Knowledge is thus achievable for all sentient organisms—those which can reflect, spontaneously act and therefore demonstrate cognitive ability. Furthermore, based on a coherentist frame- work the epistemic beliefs which can lead to knowledge justify how organisms can have systems which inform individual action. This coherentist framework uses sense data via the observation requirement to allow belief to be created and inserted within an individual’s personal system.

The complexity of this system is what defines the difference be- tween species and, further, cog- nitive ability. Notably, humans will be able to accomplish much more complex thought and con- structions of belief (and further knowledge,) but because the ini- tial sense data is the same for all sentient organisms, the basis for knowledge must, therefore, be on the same scale.

The complexity of the interpretation of this initial sense data then allows for differentiation. This can be exemplified in the flamingo which has convoluted mating techniques which hinge on the cooperation of a large group, as well as a vast amount of external factors (some of which have been determined to depend on the temperament of the birds at that specific time). This kind of framework also allows for fallibility which is important in maintaining truth despite possibly being mistaken because of inaccurate interpretation of sense data or an inaccurate epistemic belief system.

Reflection is paramount in determining whether or not or- ganisms actually retain a system of epistemic belief; reflection is a trait that all sentient beings hold—to varying degrees. It is noted that without the ability for organisms to reflect then struc- tured decision-making would not occur as consistently and stead- fastly as it does. That is, I make the claim that beings which are sentient are aware of their deci- sion-making in the past which allows for them to make further informed decisions based on the existence of observed consistency, as elaborated above. Then, lan- guage is not necessary for coher- entism to be applied in this case because reflection can be dem- onstrated in action rather than through explicit communication. Language, then, will also not alter the standards of knowledge but enforces the idea that different cognitive abilities exist which al- low for more complex societal sys- tems to be constructed; reflection can still occur so the coherentist framework may still be applied.

Therefore, it can be concluded that knowledge is on the same scale for all sentient beings as justified by a coherentist frame- work and further hinging on the premise that these organisms can reflect.

References

Kornblith, H, 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford: Ox- ford University Press.

Bonjour, L, 2002, “The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.” Episte- mology: Contemporary Readings. 2nd edn. ed. M. Huemer, New York: Routledge, pp. 387-40.

Studer-Thiersch, A, 2000, ‘What 19 Years of Observation on Captive Greater Flamingos Suggests about Adaptations to Breeding un- der Irregular Conditions’, Waterbirds: The International Journal of Waterbird Biology 23, pp. 150–159.

"What I am trying to do is demonstrate the relationship between the questions that individuals have faced a long time ago, like Nietzsche or William James or Sartre, and to point out that those questions are not necessarily com- pletely different from those that we experience today.

We can regard philosophers from the history of western philosophy, primarily, but also non-western traditions, as companions in misery. And that is at least a little bit of solace.

I think that it is possible to intellectualize your life, but you are going to discover that then you are not actually being very honest about life. So, for a very long time, I tried to conform my life and my experiences to the phi- losophers who I was enjoying at the time—whether it be Nietzsche or William James or Emerson or Thoreau or Margaret Fuller or Simone de Beauvoir—I tried to change the way that I related to the world on the basis of what

I would read. And I think that that is very helpful in certain respects because philosophy is supposed to be applied in some ways. But it can also be very disastrous, because we can oftentimes use philosophy as a type of intellectual escapism rather than something to enrich life. We oftentimes, as philosophers we lovers of winded wisdom, have a tendency to flee lived experience and hang out in the ivory castle. "

-John Kaag, Ph.D., professor of philosophy at Umass Lowell