Knowledge and Coherentism: Standardized Justifications for True Belief

Lauren Dotson • Trinity University

Introduction:

Human knowledge and knowledge of non-human organisms cannot justifiably be separated. Knowledge is belief which is reliably produced based on truth. Knowledge, for an organism, must then have some kind of system of truth—structure which allows belief to have basis—which informs decision-making. A system of knowledge burgeons from this establishment of truth, allowing for of the justifications of  knowledge to be shared  amongst all those who reliably and consistently inhabit reality. Systems of belief can be cultivated based on coherentist theory thus allowing for fallible ideas of truth to be justifiably gleaned. Through this framework, organisms can understand a proposition of kind, p, to be true. An explicit criteria can be fabricated from this system allowing for truth and falsehood to be observed from a range of organisms. Then, human knowledge is set on the same criteria as non-human organisms. Due to a sliding scale of cognitive capacities the capabilities for knowledge can vary; still, knowledge is distinctly on the same scale for all organisms. 

Defense:

Coherentism is the epistemic justification of belief which argues that circular reasoning is justified grounds for establishing truth in a fallible manner. As stated by Laurence Bonjour, coherentism attempts to establish a method of epistemic belief which avoids the epistemic regress problem. The epistemic regress problem states that any rationalization for basic beliefs can only be justified if the justification does not end in: circular reasoning, infinite regress, and termination in unjustified belief. Bonjour’s coherentism firstly argues for circular reasoning going against the epistemic regress problem to assert that belief can be justified via circular reasoning formats. Bonjour thus uses circular reasoning to state that a belief can be justified by the: inferability from another set of particular beliefs, coherence and justification of the overall system of basic empirical beliefs, and, given that the justification of a particular basic empirical belief is due to its standing in the system of other basic empirical beliefs (Bonjour 2002, p. 389). Further, this system of belief can be justified via the observation requirement which allows sense data to justify belief (Bonjour 2002, 396).

This kind of proposed system allows for a sequence and system of thoughts to be crafted for an individual allowing truth to be found fallibly through epistemic belief. This proves to be a crucial point because this allows organisms to have a system of truth which is true and can be fallibly understood based on their personal cognitive abilities. Organisms can have a range of cognitive abilities which allow them to understand their systems of truth differently. I argue that the system of truth for organisms stack on each other as cognitive ability increases. Thus, our systems of truth are different, but only in the sense that there are more details and empirical beliefs that exist as cognitive ability increases. That is, some organisms maintain a higher order, more sophisticated, belief system than others, but these beliefs in themselves are justified by a coherentist framework. The coherentist framework that this paper will be working within does not necessarily entail Bonjour’s exact coherentist theory, but parts of Bonjour’s coherentism, elaborated and reconstructed to better answer the epistemic belief question for organisms. 

Thus, knowledge is truth which is reliably produced based on true belief that is true for the system. Given both criteria are true then knowledge can be gleaned. If both aren’t true, and it's true only for the system, then you can have a system of belief and fallible truth but not knowledge. Knowledge has a circular structure because it allows for beliefs to connect and inform other beliefs that an individual holds. This kind of structure allows for inferential justification which can aid in the attenuation of new information into the organism’s system of belief and thus allow for truth to be had. Given that truth can be fallibly gained, that means these justification of truth systems can be edited when they are proved wrong while still retaining truth and the possibility for knowledge. 

Then, I argue that despite some organisms having a higher cognitive ability allowing for more elaborate systems of truth the justification for this truth is the same. This is because the organisms, if they interact with each other, must exist in the same plane allowing for the sense data of one organism to be comparable to the sense data of another organism. This base level sense data can be used as justification for epistemic beliefs (as a part of the observation requirement). This exhibits that organisms’, if they exist in the same plane and can actively build communities, must experience the same sense data which means that justification for beliefs must be the same for these organisms.

To elaborate, one might wonder if plants can have cognitive ability and such. To this I would say that we must first establish that the reason why sentient animals can have a system of truth is because they have a mentalistic framework which can be observed through their behavior and social frameworks. For plants the same framework is not present as they consistently do not present a basal level of cognitive ability. I thus introduce a spectrum basis where there is cognitive ability and sentience which plants do not appear to share; this mental representation does not appear in plants as plants respond in one or two ways which are particular and do not indicate the ability to reason and make spontaneous judgment which is available in higher mental state animals (Kornblith 2002, 39-42).

Animals and organisms have a system of truth of some kind. Animals’ specific behaviors and social practices are evidence of the fact that animals can cognitively create systems of truths and interact with these systems allowing for knowledge to be gleaned (Kornblith 2002, 34). Animals must then adhere to the observation requirement of the coherentist theory; individuals create a system of truth which allows them to have a fallible understanding. For example, different species of birds have different mating and social requirements which allow them to garner mates. Flamingos are known for their ritualistic mating dance featuring sharp head movements and back-and-forth strides across a plain. Depending on the bird's environment, access to mates, and mood, the ritualistic dance can be modified to better secure a mate. This kind of complex activity can further suggest animals are capable of creating systems of beliefs due to their ability to use the observation requirement to inform individual, and later collective action (Studer-Thiersch 2000, 150). 

Furthermore, the flamingos’ behavior and success in their environment indicates cognitive ability. It is mentioned in the text that the flamingos can spot, evade, rebut and predators depicting a cognitive ability which can be translated to demonstrated action (Studer-Thiersch 2000, 157). It is determined that animals consistently (as derived from our system of truth as described above) have intentional action which allows for intentional purpose.  Animal behavior is not random because the animals respond, particularly and specifically, to their environment and outward influences (Kornblith 2002, 42). Thus this exhibits the idea that animals are affected and influenced by the exterior world; this further demonstrates cognitive ability as the animals actively make decisions and respond to their system’s of truth. 

The crucial part is that collective action occurs for these organisms; the flamingo’s actively work together as a unit to reconstruct their mating dance. This exhibits how organism’s existing on the same plane can share the same experience of sense data which serves as justification for their belief. and thus later informing decision-making; in this case, how the mating dance will manifest in a particular season. Moreover, flamingo’s seem to exhibit a level of cognitive ability in order to be able to complete these actions; however, this cognitive ability, based on what we have qualitatively observed from these birds, does not seem to be on the same level as human cognitive ability. Yet, these animals are still able to interpret their environment in a similar manner to how humans would. That is, flamingos are able to interpret their sense data to be able to, for example, recognize time of day and schedule their routines based on the perceived time (whether it's light or dark outside). Humans can also recognize time of day and we also schedule routines based on this. 

This was an elaborate example to explain that despite flamingos and humans being vastly different organisms they can experience sense data in a similar manner and have specific reactions to this data. Furthermore, there is a distinct cognitive difference between these two organisms given that one set is able to effectively create rudimentary societal structures (flamingos) and the other able to build exceedingly complex societal structures and systems (humans). Thus, this exhibits that despite the cognitive divide, the fundamental justifications to allow for the creation of these structures lies in sense data that we appear to interpret in similar fashions; that is, the justifications for our, flamingo and human, beliefs come from the same source, yet the way that sense data is later interpreted and used depends on the cognitive ability of the organism. This kind of analysis can also be applied to a wide variety of sentient organisms, which appear to build structures similar to humans.

An objection may arise that suggests that human cognitive ability is vastly different from other organisms and should thus exist in its own category due to the existence of complex language systems and societal structures. That is, the existence of, specifically, human language provides a basis to assert that justifiably differentiates human system of truth (and thus knowledge) from non-human system of truth and knowledge. I argue that the capacity for language is not essential to change the standard of knowledge because the systems of truth still conform to the present basic facts which then inform the human ability to converse. This base level of truth is then shared amongst all organisms, however humans may be the only ones to have the active cognitive ability to build off the essential truths and converse—this does not speak to the fact that system of truth is inaccurate for other organisms’ instead it confirms that different cognitive abilities are present among disjoint organisms. To elucidate, despite other organisms, say the flamingo, not having a method of concrete communication, this does not mean they are unable to represent facts about the world. Flamingos must have some other form of communication between themselves which allows for the species to build their intricate mating styles. This kind of logic may also be applied to other species of organisms.

To conclude, I assert that organisms do not need language to have belief when the justification for belief is based around the same sense data that all organisms appear to share which allows for lower-level signs of communication which can in itself show that organisms have the similar systems of truth. That is, animal behavior exhibits social interaction which confirms that the justification for their systems are shared between organisms as exhibited through animal social hierarchies and ability to reproduce which is akin to rudimentary human communities.

Reflection, as in internal thoughts of memories and information, furthermore, is necessary for the justification of retained belief. I argue that the existence of  different mental capacities does not make knowledge different for different minds because the  standards of knowledge remain consistent despite differences in cognitive capacities (Kornblith 2002, 105). Then, organisms must retain a baseline ability to reflect which allows them to build these systems of belief and make decisions based on their systems. For example, this would be how flamingos are able to change their mating dance depending on mood, place or both (Studer-Thiersch). Thus, the ability of organisms to curve or change behavior based on success or mood entails reflection because it demonstrates the ability to build some kind of rudimentary system to organize thoughts. That is, I’m suggesting that the motions of organisms and the routines they appear to have are not arbitrary but suggest a sort of cognitive intelligence which is  elementarily comparable to human intelligence. Observed consistency is then seen within these sentient organisms which allows for this direct action to be detected. This kind of system creation and use is of course fallible—prone to mistakes—and yet this does not suggest that these decisions are randomly made, merely that they are based in a system which has been inaccurately constructed. For example, when a young flamingo tries to find a mate during a low rainfall season and is subsequently rejected by all the females who only mate during high rainfall (because more food is available at this time) (Struder-Thiersch 2002, 154). 

To clarify, human knowledge cannot be argued to be separate from non-human knowledge on the basis of reflection as this then asserts that there is a specific threshold of metacognition that is necessary to have all knowledge in itself. I argue that reflection is a sliding scale ability that organisms who are able to actively react to their surroundings utilize in order to have spontaneous decision-making. There is not a threshold for metacognition then but more of the recognition of the ability and the different levels of said ability. Thus the ability to reflect is necessary for reflection and I argue that because of organisms spontaneous ability to decide they demonstrate a level of reflection which fits the coherentist framework. To give an example,  when a dog sticks its head into a prickly cactus and gets stabbed. The dog will later avoid such plants in the future demonstrating an action which reflects the dog's understanding of its system of belief.  This would then demonstrate the dog’s ability to cognitively reflect—as the dog’s actions speak to recognizing a piece of information in their belief framework and utilizing this belief to act. Further its the beings ability to also have spontaneous action despite their systems of belief which can be categorized as exploration; this helps distinguish the sentient being as 1) having an internal state and 2) acting as a sentient being not a reactionary machine (Kornblith 2002, 37). 

Yet another objection would be one that discounts the foundations of coherentism. Given that coherentism works off a circular framework some may wonder how this kind of system avoids the epistemic regress problem surrounding circular reasoning. To this I would respond by maintaining that the coherentist framework is a different kind of belief system altogether which requires that the system itself be both the justification and evidence of belief. Given that the two other parts of the regress problem—termination in unjustified belief and going on infinitely—are versions of skepticism then the circularity premise is the only one to which a system of coherent belief can be framed (Bonjour 2002, 389). It is akin to viewing the problem of epistemic regress in a different light, coherentism is a completely different kind of belief system from that of its predecessor: foundationalism. Further, the coherentist framework is like comparing algebra versus calculus—both of which are completely different and approach solutions to the same problem divergently

Summary

Knowledge is thus achievable for all sentient organisms—those which can reflect, spontaneously act and therefore demonstrate cognitive ability. Furthermore, based on a coherentist framework the epistemic beliefs which can lead to knowledge justify how organisms can have systems which inform individual action. This coherentist framework uses sense data via the observation requirement to allow belief to be created and inserted within an individual’s personal system. The complexity of this system is what defines the difference between species and, further, cognitive ability. Notably, humans will be able to accomplish much more complex thought and constructions of belief (and further knowledge,) but because the initial sense data is the same for all sentient organisms, the basis for knowledge must, therefore, be on the same scale. 

The complexity of the interpretation of this initial sense data then allows for differentiation. This can be exemplified in the flamingo which has convoluted mating techniques which hinge on the cooperation of a large group, as well as a vast amount of external factors (some of which have been determined to depend on the temperament of the birds at that specific time).  This kind of framework also allows for fallibility which is important in maintaining truth despite possibly being mistaken because of inaccurate interpretation of sense data or an inaccurate epistemic belief system.

Reflection is paramount in determining whether or not organisms actually retain a system of epistemic belief; reflection is a trait that all sentient beings hold—to varying degrees. It is noted that without the ability for organisms to reflect then structured decision-making would not occur as consistently and steadfastly as it does. That is, I make the claim that beings which are sentient are aware of their decision-making in the past which allows for them to make further informed decisions based on the existence of observed consistency, as elaborated above.  Then, language is not necessary for coherentism to be applied in this case because reflection can be demonstrated in action rather than through explicit communication. Language, then, will also not alter the standards of knowledge but enforces the idea that different cognitive abilities exist which allow for more complex societal systems to be constructed; reflection can still occur so the coherentist framework may still be applied. 

Therefore, it can be concluded that knowledge is on the same scale for all sentient beings as justified by a coherentist framework and further hinging on the premise that these organisms can reflect.

References

Kornblith, H, 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bonjour, L, 2002,  “The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.” Epistemology: Contemporary Readings. 2nd edn. ed. M. Huemer, New York: Routledge, pp. 387-40.

Studer-Thiersch, A, 2000,  ‘What 19 Years of Observation on Captive Greater Flamingos Suggests about Adaptations to Breeding under Irregular Conditions’, Waterbirds: The International Journal of Waterbird Biology 23, pp. 150–159.