The Nature Quotient: Free Will as a Biological Process

Igor Kojadinovic • University of Central Florida

Introduction:

Historically, the question “Do we have free will?” has been viewed through the lens of the natural world or theology. In the present age, the advent of brain imaging technology has given researchers insight into a realm untrodden—the human mind. Thus, a new dynamic has been introduced to the discussion of free will with its foundation built upon empirical data. Research in neuroscience has received much scrutiny by philosophers and phenomenologists since taking its seat at the table. However, despite contemporary technological limitations, numerous studies show increasingly compelling data that acts of conscious intent are precipitated by unconscious neural events. Empirical research suggests that free will is a complex biological and environmental process for which the evidence exists in the rudiments of physiology.

Neuroscience:

For this discussion, it is important to ground the relationship between consciousness and free will. Classically, consciousness has been viewed by Western philosophers as the divine spark that bestows meaning upon the vehicle of the body. Consciousness is the awareness of memory, emotion, desire, and intention, such that if it did not exist, humans would be mere automata. Accordingly, the question of free will in contemporary philosophical and neuroscientific discussion is popularly framed as follows: does consciousness play a causal role in action? When one approaches the question in this context, they associate free will with bodily movement. To this notion, Benjamin Libet’s use of the experimentalist method reveals startling data. In Libet’s experiment, acts of choice were preceded by neural activity 350-400ms prior to the subjects’ awareness of their desired action. This activity is considered the readiness potential. The data suggests that acts of free will are caused by unconscious neural precursors and that consciousness is epiphenomenal, meaning it plays no causal role in action.

The consistency of the readiness potential preceding volitional acts provides compelling data. However, a difference of milliseconds when discussing a variable as difficult to quantify as the window of choice offers prime grounds for dispute. There has been no shortage of objections  founded upon the notion that a question of this depth cannot be answered in the frame of hundredths of a second. With research methods and technology in experimental neuroscience still in its beginning stages, Libet acknowledges the inevitable shortcomings of his experiment. He states, “It is possible that cerebral activity is initiated at times earlier than the onset of the recorded RP in some other regions”. Libet’s early experiments rattled the philosophical community, resulting in a resurgence of the conversation of free will. Subsequent experimental trials dug deeper to find more compelling evidence of neurological precursors.

The cortical region that revealed the RP in Libet’s experiments is the supplementary motor area (SMA). With such limited precursor-like activity, however, these findings could indicate skewed self-scrutinizing data, in which a test subject gathers data about their own experience. However, Chun Siong Soon and colleagues conducted an experiment that followed processes similar to those of Libet and began to find neurological trends via fMRI monitoring. The recorded trends allowed for a system of cognitive mapping that identifies consistent neural activity while performing specific actions. In turn, Soon and colleagues were able to identify precursory neural activity in the frontopolar and parietal cortices up to 10s prior to conscious awareness of the desired action.

Interpreting these findings is not straightforward. Soon and colleagues state, “To rule out the idea that any leading activity merely reflects unspecific preparatory activation, it is necessary to study free decisions between more than one behavioral option.” Accordingly, the trials involved independent scenarios with no control function and a portion in which the subjects were exposed to leading variables. The results remained fixed. The conclusion drawn is that neural activity precedes conscious intent in “high-level planning stages” that is then stored in the frontopolar cortex and undergoes scrutiny by “decision-related information” before it reaches awareness. Such findings support the epiphenomenalist notion that consciousness is limited to taking part in the awareness of intent. As temporal factors experienced in the environment are processed by information hubs in the brain, complex unconscious neurologic activity determines risk vs. reward elements until the individual experiences a desire to act.

 

Phenomenology:

The question—Do we have free will?—receives a very straightforward answer in the realm of neuroscience. It is answered through the frame of, can consciousness generate neural events that lead to bodily movement? However, phenomenologically, there are several unaddressed factors with such a singular approach. Within the physicalist worldview, Libet’s and subsequent neuroscientific findings are not particularly revolutionary. For an organism that synaptically processes information from its environment and translates unconscious neural activity into conscious movement, the RP is a natural finding. Accordingly, the causal relationship between unconscious processes and action is not heavily debated. The issue arises when the aforementioned relationship is used as proof for a deterministic model.

It is prudent to describe what is meant when I say that the causal relationship is not heavily debated. Reflective and perceptual theories on movement hold that it is some form of awareness of the intention of an action or of the “proprioceptive and visual” feedback that characterizes an action as conscious. As reflective or perceptual information follows cognitive pathways back to consciousness, the preceding action is given value as successful or unsuccessful—the actual physical means by which the action is carried out is governed by physical laws as described by the Cartesian concept of mind. As Gallagher states, “If we were normally required to consciously represent our movements in a Cartesian mental space before we effected them in a worldly space, we would have to exert great cognitive effort and slow things down to a significant degree.” Such theories bifurcate the conversation of free will into two categories: proximal will (the means) and distal will (the ends); this topic will be covered in the philosophical implications section as it relates to biological function.

Phenomenologically, there is an inherent issue with the nature of Libet-like experiments. Experiment-dependent quantitative data is gathered from introspective information communicated by participants. There are two major factors to consider: the question of how one identifies the genesis of a conscious act of will and the weak introspective measures used to do so—the two are as inseparable as they are independent. It is pertinent to note, though, that introspective data as coined by Gallagher, in the “very weak sense,” is standardly used as evidence in experimental science. The notion involves the subject reflectively communicating information about their cognitive experience. In the experiments conducted by Soon and colleagues, subjects reflected upon their mental state when they felt the conscious will to push the button and were asked to communicate that information. The issue lies with identifying whether the subjects were reflecting upon the genesis of intent or upon the visualization of their finger pressing the button. The imperative of the experiment is the ability to identify the moment in which one generates the will to act. Nevertheless, the subject carries prior environmental and action-related biases—a difficult obstacle to overcome as the subject must have knowledge of the actions they are expected to perform. Thus, a buildup of proprioceptive and environmental stimuli taint the spontaneous mental state sought by the researcher.

 

Philosophical Implications:

Despite my objection to the concept of absolute free will—the notion that an individual’s consciousness is the dominating force in all behavior—there is a palpable duality in the undercurrent of consciousness. However, the advent of technology is responsible for the divergence from metaphysical explanations for the nature of consciousness to concepts that provide quantitative scientific support.

The notion that there are layers in the role consciousness plays in free will refers to the concession that trivial tasks such as the pressing of a button or a flick of the wrist are preceded and predetermined by unconscious neural events. However, what follows this exception is a reclassification of the structure of free will. Generally, when one considers free will, it is conceptualized by an ability to make a decision and carry out an act. In light of recent neuroscientific findings, the formulation of ideas is attributed to distal will (the end-goal), while the physical action carried out is referred to as proximal will (the means). Accordingly, objections to the notion that consciousness is epiphenomenal argue that Libet-like experiments are limited in scope claiming that they exclusively test acts of proximal will, which are not a comprehensive representation of conscious intent.

For example, consider the action of throwing a ball. The steps you take in the direction of the ball, the arm with which you reach down to pick it up, the grasping of your fingers around it, and the wind-up and release of the ball are subject to quantitative measure as related to the neurological impulses that precipitate your actions. However, despite the ability to quantify the factors involved in the outward expression of intent, there still exists the currently immeasurable precursor to action—the desire to play catch with your friend.

The duality of proximal and distal will is akin to the relationship of action vs. intent. As mentioned earlier, Gallagher notes that Libet-like findings are not surprising as complete attentiveness and intention behind menial finger and hand movements would markedly “slow things down.” In this context, the causal relationship of proximal will is relinquished to precursory neural activity, making it a biological and environmental function. Yet, proximal and distal will remain separate ends of the same thread tying consciousness together; if the former is governed by the laws of nature, so too is the latter.

As it is presently known, functions of the body are governed by the autonomic (involuntary) and the somatic (voluntary) nervous systems. In the context of this discussion, proximal will can be associated with involuntary response and distal will with voluntary. Within the realm of physiology and biology, many bodily functions are associated with involuntary response, i.e., breathing, pulse, and thermoregulation. However, the listed functions can be influenced by factors of voluntary origin, for example, holding one’s breath, vigorous activity, or venturing into the cold or heat. Nevertheless, the body must maintain a state of homeostasis—one must eventually take a breath, rest from activity, or seek shelter from an extreme environment—or the body will shut down. The autonomic and somatic nervous systems are also heavily influenced by environmental factors such as climate, levels of danger, risk vs. reward, and so on. Such information is constantly being processed by various conscious and unconscious sensory mechanisms and translated into observable behavior.

As it follows, distal will—an individual’s formulation of abstract ideas and intentions—is subject to environmental factors based upon information gathered by sensory mechanisms. It is feasible that as variations in behavioral trends accumulate nuanced findings, cognitive schematics grow in complexity to formulate intricate ideas. The issue with such claims is the limitation of modern technology to test and account for such factors. Accordingly, many contemporary theories on the phenomenology of free will must turn to qualitative evidence. An interesting field of study to consider is that of the relationship between athletes and peak performance.

Elite-level athletes are considered masters of their physical attributes and the ways in which they utilize their bodies in their respective disciplines. Yet, during stressful situations of immense pressure, they too are known to falter. However, there are those remarkable moments in which one feels that nothing can stop them, every movement is impeccable, that they are in a state of flow. Susan Jackson’s qualitative experiment on flow states in elite-level figure skaters reveals insight to the agency one feels in peak physical states. On the requisites for eliciting flow state, Jackson notes, “Merging of action and awareness describes the complete involvement of person with activity… feeling in control without actively seeking control are further components of flow states”. It is the ambiguous notion of control that is most interesting in states of deep physical and mental symbiosis. One participant notes:

It was just one of those programs that clicked. I mean everything went right, everything felt good . . . it’s just such a rush, like you feel it could go on and on and on, like you don’t want it to stop because it’s going so well. It’s almost as though you don’t have to think, it’s like everything goes automatically without thinking . . . it’s like you’re in automatic pilot, so you don’t have any thoughts. You hear the music but you’re not aware that you’re hearing it, because it’s a part of it all.

Such claims are a testament to the relationship between proximal and distal will. As proximal will (the means) is simulated repeatedly to achieve distal will (the end-goal), the individual hones the edge of their blade to make a finer cut upon the situation in which they must perform. What results is a state in which the individual’s proximal and distal will become synergistic.

Conversely, it is important to ask, what is the implication of damage to regions of the brain involved with high-level planning stages and information processing? In an experiment on risk vs. reward, individuals with bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortices not only show a lack of awareness to disadvantageous trends in data, they lack signs of the autonomic responses associated with decisions of high risk. Meanwhile, subjects with normal functioning brain mechanics unanimously make choices associated with advantageous trends in data. These findings are either a result of subjects with self-destructive behavior and a lack of reason, or they exemplify the importance that unconscious biological and environmental processes play in situations of conscious intent.

Further evidence for the importance of proper brain chemistry and mechanics can be found in individuals suffering from degenerative cognitive disease. Disorders such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s affect the continuity of memory, thought, and motor skill. Often, individuals lose a sense of agency, as though the essence of intention escapes them, replaced by senseless peculiarities. Hence, the importance the brain plays in consciousness is unequivocal—it is the house of consciousness. Without the proper neural infrastructure and mechanics, the brain fails to create the divine spark that characterizes the human condition. 

Conclusion:

The objective of this paper is to provide evidence that free will is a biological and environmental process. It is not to suggest that free will is a construct with no bearing on the human experience. On the contrary, it is a profound consciousness that makes the human experience unique.

Libet’s and subsequent neuroscientific findings lay a foundation for the biological claim. What follows is a reclassification of the structure of free will in proximal and distal will. An argument is made that the concession of proximal will being subject to unconscious processes implicates distal will as well. Further evidence is provided for the importance of properly functioning brain mechanics in relation to carrying out desired action. Consequently, despite barriers faced by current technology, free will is not at the whim of consciousness. Instead, it is a product of biology and environment of which we are simply aware.

Bibliography:

Bechara, Antoine, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel, and Antonio R. Damasio. “Deciding Advantageously before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy.” Science 275, no. 5304 (1997): 1293–95. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.275.5304.1293.

Brunton, Laurence L., Randa Hilal-Dandan, Knollmann Björn C., Thomas C. Westfall, Heather Macarthur, and David P. Westfall. “Chapter 8 Neurotransmission: The Autonomic and Somatic Motor Nervous Systems.” Essay. In Goodman Et Gilman's the Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, 115–48. New York, NY: McGraw Hill Education, 2018.

Gallagher, Shaun, and Jesper Brøsted Sørensen. “Experimenting with Phenomenology.” Consciousness and Cognition 15, no. 1 (2006): 119–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.03.002.

Jackson, Susan A. “Athletes in Flow: A Qualitative Investigation of Flow States in Elite Figure Skaters.” Journal of Applied Sport Psychology 4, no. 2 (1992): 161–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209208406459.

Libet, Benjamin, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright, and Dennis K. Pearl. “Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential).” Brain 106, no. 3 (1983): 623–42. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623.

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Endnotes:

  1.  Physicists such as Isaac Newton (Principia) claimed that natural law does not leave room for free will—once a physical act is in motion, it follows a mathematically predictable path.

  2. Figures like Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica) and Saint Augustine (On Free Choice of the Will) held that free will is a property of the human condition bestowed upon us by God.

  3. Benjamin Libet, “Do We Have Free Will?” The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2005, 550–64. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.003.0025.

  4. Benjamin Libet et al., “Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential).” Brain 106, no. 3 (1983): 623–42. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623.

  5. Cognitive mapping involves recording a person or group’s mental model while experiencing a particular process or concept. The result of creating a “complete” cognitive model could provide the ability to correlate complex behavior with neurological states thus providing a means of predicting outcomes with near-perfect accuracy.

  6. Chun Siong Soon et al., “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain.” Nature Neuroscience 11, no. 5 (2008): 543–45. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2112.

  7. Soon, Unconscious Determinants, 543.

  8. Soon, Unconscious Determinants, 545.

  9. Shaun Gallagher, Susan Pockett, and William P. Banks, “Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will.” Essay. In Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?, 109–24. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2006.

  10. Gallagher, Epiphenomenalism, 117.

  11. Shaun Gallagher, and Jesper Brøsted Sørensen. “Experimenting with Phenomenology.” Consciousness and Cognition 15, no. 1 (2006): 119–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.03.002.

  12. Soon, Unconscious Determinants, 543-45.

  13. Jason E. Plaks, and Jeffrey S. Robinson, “Proximal and Distal Intent: Toward a New Folk Theory of Intentional Action.” Review of General Psychology 21, no. 3 (2017): 242–54. https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000122.

  14. Gallagher, Epiphenomenalism, 117.

  15. Suzanne Wakim, and Mandeep Grewal. 2021. “Peripheral Nervous System.” Butte College. September 4, 2021. https://bio.libretexts.org/@go/page/16786.

  16. Factors such as age, gender, culture, ethnicity, past experiences and so on. How does one reconcile the inability to incorporate such pertinent information?

  17. Susan A. Jackson, “Athletes in Flow: A Qualitative Investigation of Flow States in Elite Figure Skaters.” Journal of Applied Sport Psychology 4, no. 2 (1992): 161–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209208406459.

  18. Jackson, Flow States, 168.

  19. Antoine Bechara et al., “Deciding Advantageously before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy.” Science 275, no. 5304 (1997): 1293–95. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.275.5304.1293.

  20. Bechara, Deciding Advantageously, 1293.