On Friendship: Ancient Theories and a Modern Perspective

“...but what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out.”

Plato, Lysis

William Kim • Notre Dame University

Abstract

Friendship is a fundamental aspect of human life, as it is one of many natural ways in which relationships develop between individuals. In Plato’s Lysis, Socrates explores the foundations of friendship. Specifically, he seeks to understand what leads to such a relationship and what types of people end up becoming friends. But as the above quotation suggests, despite a thorough inquiry into friendship, Socrates does not come to a satisfying conclusion by the end of the dialogue. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, friendship is similarly explored in Books VIII and IX and seems to use ideas laid out in the Lysis as a foundation. Aristotle systematically constructs a view of friendship that convincingly bypasses many of the issues presented in the Lysis, and in some respects, completely rejects notions developed by Socrates. Looking many centuries beyond the time of these philosophers, Michel de Montaigne offers a perspective on friendship that pushes Aristotle’s construction even further. Equipped with all three outlooks on friendship, we review the cogency of the conclusions drawn and their applicability to the modern age. 

An Account of Friendship in Plato’s Lysis

Throughout the Lysis, Socrates engages with the younger Lysis and Menexenus to come to conclusions on these questions regarding friendship. After considering many different schemas and then refuting them, Socrates articulates a valid account of friendship from section 217c to 218c, where he deduces that it must be neither good nor bad. And it is through the presence of the bad, one can befriend the good. To provide context around his argument, it is important to consider some of the earlier conclusions that Socrates discovers in his conversation with Lysis and other participants. His focus is on friendship, and specifically, what qualities are possessed by those who are friends. Earlier arguments lead Socrates, alongside others, to believe that the bad cannot be friends with anyone, while the good also cannot be friends with the good. In addition, he concludes that opposites cannot be friends, and neither can those that are alike. Thus, all of these results lead Socrates to consider a different argument in support of the friendship between dissimilar individuals.

Socrates begins his argument by presenting an interesting thought experiment involving paint. He asks his listeners to consider whether a painted entity is “of the same sort, as far as color goes, as the applied paint”. To clarify on this question, he asks further whether hair painted white is truly white in nature; or does it only exhibit the characteristics of white due to the colored paint. He then points out that hair, over time, can also naturally turn white and truly maintain whiteness in likeness. Here, he uses the color white as a representation of the bad, while the hair plays the role of the neutral--of neither good nor bad. He uses this line of questioning to conclude that what is neither good nor bad, when in the presence of the bad, does not necessarily embody the bad, but just like the hair, can over time change to exhibit badness. This distinction between manifesting the bad and only having it present is crucial to understanding his next example, on wisdom. He claims that the wise, who embodies the good, are not interested in wisdom itself--as opposed to the deeply ignorant who embody the bad. The “neither good nor bad”, therefore, are those who exhibit ignorance and are simultaneously aware of their ignorance, and Socrates concludes that these types of people are the ones who truly love and pursue wisdom. Ignorance, here, is a bad quality that can be present in people (who seemingly can be attributed as neither good nor bad), but its presence does not necessarily make people bad. Thus, Socrates makes it clear that the presence of the bad does not necessarily make the “neither good nor bad” -- truly bad. Rather, the presence of the bad compels the “neither good nor bad” to love the good, as he proclaims:

“So now, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered for sure what is a friend and what it is friend to. For we maintain that in the soul and in the body and everywhere, that which is neither good nor bad itself is, by the presence of evil, a friend of the good”.

With this, it seems as though a conclusion has been settled.

It is also interesting to point out here that there may be an inspiration for the concept of the “mean”, which is further developed and systematized in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Socrates makes it clear that there is a striking difference in levels of ignorance. The wise are represented as the “good”, while the truly ignorant are said to embody the “bad”. Concurrently, Socrates implies that there is a middle ground between these extremes, a level of ignorance in which one has “not yet been made ignorant and stupid by it”. This level of ignorance, which is designated as “neither good nor bad”, is crucial, as he claims that it is only those who exhibit this quality that can be friends with wisdom. This middle ground of ignorance is very reminiscent of achieving the mean as Aristotle describes in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, as it seems to exist between a characteristic of excess and one of deficiency, which are both described as “vices”. Although describing wisdom as an “excess” may seem oxymoronic, it must be understood that the virtue that is being measured here is not necessarily wisdom itself, but rather one’s temperament to pursue wisdom. As a result, it may be best to describe this example as one demonstrating the three dispositions of humility. With the vice of deficiency there is an unconscious absence of humility resulting from inability to know otherwise, while with the vice of excess, there is a lack of humility resulting from an abundance of knowledge. 

Nevertheless, much can be said about whether this account of friendship is even plausible. To start, one fundamental issue is that Socrates sees friendship as a monolith, and no attempts are made to consider whether there could be different types of friendship formed by different kinds of individuals. Therefore, it seems that the various conclusions he develops are narrow-minded, as he constructs accounts and rejects them for the sole desire of attempting to  discover what is behind the formation of a friendship. If there were various forms of friendship, as will soon be discussed, then it follows that his accounts need to specify the type of friendship. In addition, Socrates is using the word “love” (philia) to annotate friendship, which leads to a confusing construction of friendship in the Lysis. In his discussion, friendship is not simply between individuals—it also serves as a connective force between objects such as the body and the health. This account of friendship diminishes the importance and relevance of Socrates’ initial pursuit, which is to discover “how one person becomes the friend of another”. Such a broad view of friendship cannot possibly speak accurately to human relationships. Finally, a “disanalogy” in Socrates’ account further highlights the plausibility of his argumentation. In a previous construction, Socrates claims that the body, with the presence of sickness, becomes friends with medical expertise. In this example, medical expertise seems to be interchangeable with a doctor. However, with his example of wisdom, Socrates claims interchangeability between the wise and wisdom. In doing so, he further emphasizes his notion of love, desire, and friendships between people and objects. If interchangeability was permitted in every case to allow for an individual to serve as a substitute for an object, then this account can surely be seen as a defense for human friendship. 

Aristotelian Construction of Friendship in his Nicomachean Ethics

To resolve the issues that Socrates and his interlocutors face in the Lysis, consider the account of friendship laid out by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics: In Book VIII, Aristotle begins his examination of friendship by stating that “[n]o one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all the other goods”. Immediately, Aristotle makes an encompassing point about human nature: Human beings are drawn to one another despite the difficult circumstances of life. Socrates would most likely agree with this claim, as in the Lysis, as he states

“…I would rather have a good friend than the best quail or gamecock known to man, and, I swear by Zeus above, more than any horse or dog”.

It is important to recognize that both Plato (through Socrates, in the Lysis) and Aristotle are similarly motivated in their pursuits of understanding friendship because both view such relationships with high regard. The value and importance of friendship are priceless, and so it seems imperative to understand how such relationships can form and what is required of individuals for friendships to blossom. 

With this in mind, Aristotle continues in his Ethics by constructing three species of friendship: One of utility, one of pleasure, and one of completeness. First, a friendship of utility is formed between people for the sake of “what is good for themselves,” as seen in relationships that form based on shared interests. Second, a friendship of pleasure is formed for the sake of what is pleasurable for both parties, as seen in relationships developed by sex partners. Aristotle notes that these friendships tend to be the most unstable, “often changing in one day,” as once what is useful or pleasurable is lost to either party, the relationship crumbles. As such, these first two forms of friendship are labeled as “incidental,” as they heavily rely on one’s selfish desire for good or pleasure without regard for the other person. Here, it is important to note that there is something sinister attached to the desire for good or pleasure—a self-interested mentality. No claims are made about whether the individuals are deficient in or maintain some level of the good or the pleasure that they seek to attain, but this desire is labeled as egocentric. While Socrates’ claim in the Lysis is that the desire for the good by what is neither good nor bad is motivated by the presence of what is bad, here it is the very desire itself that is attributed to evil. The introduction of intrinsically bad ideas develops the distinction between what is to be considered a good and a bad desire, a schema that Socrates does not consider in his argument. In highlighting this dichotomy, Aristotle makes a conscious effort to emphasize the autonomy of the individual and downplay other influences that could sway a person. In addition, he recognizes that it is an inward desire that characterizes these types of friendships and that because of this, such friendships are not ideal. Lastly, it is also important to note that these aforementioned friendships can be established between any two people, good or bad. Thus, immediately we see that certain claims that are made in the Lysis are rejected wholeheartedly in this formulation of friendship. Nonetheless, it is these two types of friendship that seem to emulate closest with what Socrates had concluded. 

Aristotle’s third type of friendship, known as complete friendship, can only be formed between good people of virtuous natures who wish for the good of the other person. In contrast to the previous two forms of friendship, complete friendships are long-lasting and “require time and familiarity” to be developed. Moreover, complete friendships experience the benefits of the other two friendships, as those who wish good and pleasure upon the other will also experience the same for themselves. Lastly, in Book IX, Aristotle describes his concept of goodwill in detail. He states that it is the wishing for the good of another, despite the wish not being reciprocated; as such, goodwill serves as friendship’s “first principle”. As such, goodwill is called “latent friendship,” as it serves as the foundation for friendship to develop between individuals. However, only complete friendship can arise from goodwill, due to its nature of wishing good upon others. A friendship of utility or pleasure cannot arise out of such an altruistic mentality. Once again, there is a contradiction here between what Aristotle claims and what conclusions are drawn in the Lysis. Here, a friendship is made possible between two goods, and it is deemed to be the highest form of friendship attainable. This formulation places further doubt on Socrates’ line of argumentation through which he concludes that such friendships between two likes are impossible. While Socrates claims that the good is not attracted to the good due to a lack of desire (since he assumes that the good would have no desire for what they already attain), Aristotle determines the motivation behind complete friendships to be for the sake of others. The good that is being sought after, by both individuals, is not necessarily a good that either individual can obtain otherwise, as it is precisely the good of the other that is being desired. Thus, Aristotle outlines an example in which one who is good can indeed pursue another good, contradicting both Socrates’ claim that likes cannot be friends and that specifically the good cannot be friends with the good. 

It is interesting to note that there is another form of friendship discussed by Aristotle that directly relates to conclusions drawn by Socrates in the Lysis—these friendships are those of superiority. A friendship of superiority is maintained by individuals, of which one is better than the other. As a result of the unbalance present within the relationship, Aristotle argues that “the affection must be proportional as well”. Thus, the ratio of love, pleasure, and utility must shift towards the benefit of the better. This species of friendship is very reminiscent of one of the conclusions that Socrates reaches in the Lysis, in which he claims that the neither good nor bad can be friends with the good. Aristotle’s construction of friendships of superiority confirms that such friendships as Socrates describes are indeed possible and widespread, as this form of friendship is present between parents and their children, as well as between those who are older and those who are younger. 

It is clear that although Socrates had a noble intention, his account of friendship in the Lysis is flawed in many different aspects. He fails to consider the possibility of a spectrum of friendship types, which leads him to make conclusions about friendships as if it were a monolithic concept. In addition, he draws confusion to his original intent of discovering the mode in which friendships arise by claiming that objects can be considered friends with each other and with individuals as well. This account further deviates from his intention due to his discrepancy in analogies, through which he allows for the interchangeability of object and human in some cases but not in others. Aristotle’s work on friendship in his Ethics accounts for the problems that are seen in the Lysis and presents a more encompassing and passable account of friendship between individuals, with hints of a Socratic influence. Nonetheless, the importance of friendship, and the incredible desire to know why and how such a relationship can blossom between individuals, is thoroughly seen through both works.

Beyond Plato and Aristotle: Montaignean Friendship and a New Outlook

In discussing the topic of friendship more broadly, it is important to consider what both Plato and Aristotle may be missing in each of their respective discussions. Michel de Montaigne’s analysis of friendship expounds an auxiliary view to Plato’s and Aristotle’s with stricter criteria worth exploring. Montaigne begins his exploration of friendship in a similar manner to Aristotle, by stating: “There seems to be nothing for which Nature has better prepared us than for fellowship”. But rather than saying that it is in human nature that friendship naturally arises, he emphasizes the role of Nature itself. Human beings in the natural world are inclined towards friendship because the environment they inhabit supports and encourages such relationships. However, Montaigne places boundaries on what types of friendships can be formed and who can develop such friendships. For example, he refutes Aristotle's conception of friendships of superiority by claiming that such relations cannot be established. When describing his reasoning as to why fathers and sons cannot be friends, he states that “friendship, being fostered by mutual confidences, cannot exist between them because of their excessive inequality”. While Aristotle makes room for such relationships to be formed by emphasizing proportionality, Montaigne claims that friendship can only be established through true equality of both parties. In addition, Montaigne develops an idea of perfect friendship that exceeds Aristotelian complete friendship, establishing a more austere standard for human relationships. He describes perfect friendship as a relationship “where wills work together,” as both individuals completely devote themselves to the other. For Montaigne, this ideal form of friendship does not end at simply having goodwill towards another, but rather once both individuals have seemingly become one. While Aristotle leaves room for the possibility for people to be in multiple complete friendships with others, Montaigne does not give the same leniency to perfect friendship. He presents a convincing argument to this judgment: “For the perfect friendship which I am talking about is indivisible: each gives himself so entirely to his friend that he has nothing to share with another”. Due to the fact that a tremendous amount of effort is required to unite two people of goodwill to this extent, an authentically perfect friendship is one of a kind and cannot be replicated.

Montaigne offers a perspective on friendship that can directly relate to questions about friendship prevalent today. To start, his rejection of friendships of superiority sheds light on the importance of power dynamics in forming healthy friendships. The plausibility of friendships of superiority is commonly challenged nowadays, especially in the context of the home. Across our society today, there is much debate about the teleological nature of the parent-child relationship. Should parents serve fundamentally as an authoritative role model for their children, or instead become uniquely intimate lifelong friends with them? Although modern social norms have leaned heavily towards accepting the notion of “parents as friends,” Montaigne voices significant disagreement. Perhaps, to Montaigne, it is more exact to consider these particular relationships pseudo-friendships: Although the parent-child relationship is directed towards the qualities of Aristotelian complete friendship, due to the crucially guiding role of the parent there will always be a degree of authority imbalance that prevents an authentic complete friendship from forming. Montaigne demonstrates that Aristotle’s construction may be too inclusive in characterizing relationships of superiority as “friendships” and encourages a more extensive analysis on the nature of relationships as a whole.  

Additionally, Montaigne’s construction of a “perfect friendship” implies an economy of friendships directed towards a singular ultimate friendship. Perhaps more broadly, Montaigne is speaking to the widespread phenomena of monogamous partnership and marriage, which can be characterized as a ritualistic affirmation of the perfect friendship established between two people. Nonetheless, this approach suggests an end to the development of friendships, which, unlike what is claimed by Plato and Aristotle, can be quite harmful. To frame forming friendships as an activity in search of a “perfect friendship” asserts that all other friendships are of less importance, which can lead to the establishment of a hierarchy of friendships. In this case, Montaigne may be overstepping. Aristotle’s idea of “complete friendship”, on the other hand, best explains how people are able to take part in many fruitful relationships at once, without having to develop a ranking between each one. 

Further, Montaigne’s articulation of friendship as being propagated by Nature suggests a deontic motive for such relationships to form. If Nature has provided an ecosystem for friendships to foster, then we as people have the obligation to interact with one another and let these relationships blossom. This notion can be extended to the constructions of friendship by Plato and Aristotle. Although both explain what types of friendships can form and what kinds of people are capable of establishing friendships, they do not articulate the moral obligation that we have as people towards each other. Consider a claim by R. Jay Wallace, which states that “morality is a domain of directed obligations and the claims constitutively connected to them”. A failure to recognize this moral obligation can be what defines one to be “bad”. Meanwhile, those who recognize this moral obligation and live by it through a sense of coercion can possibly represent those who exhibit no qualities of “goodwill”; they seek what benefits themselves, and thus, are those who enter into friendships of pleasure and utility. On the other hand, others who are seeking friendships of pleasure and utility—those who unconsciously live by this moral obligation—are those who exhibit “goodwill” and are candidates for this aforementioned form of complete friendships.

Conclusion

Plato, Aristotle, and Montaigne all approach a ubiquitous topic that is applicable to us all. As social beings, we are bound to interact with others around us, and as such, are propelled to form friendships in hopes of avoiding solitude. In exploring the nature of friendship, all three authors offer a grander perspective that encourages us to reflect on our broader desires for our relationships, to consider our relationships' fundamental substructures, and to question our deeper, and more solidified definitions of roles in them.

Bibliography

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Montaigne, Michel de. The Complete Essays. London: Penguin Group, 2003. 

Penner, Terry, and Christopher Rowe. Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato: Plato’s 

Lysis. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Plato. Plato: Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. 

Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing, 1997.

Rowan, Samuel. “What Is Relational about Morality? – With R. Jay Wallace and Stephen 

Darwall.” PEA Soup, November 2, 2023. 

https://peasoupblog.com/2023/10/what-is-relational-about-morality-with-r-jay-wallace-and-stephen-darwall/.